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Abstract. This paper studies implementation of taxation methods in one-commo-
dity environments in which the incomes of the agents are unknown to the planner.
Feasibility out of equilibrium imposes that the mechanism depend on the envi-
ronment. We present two mechanisms. The ﬁrst one, which requires complete
information, implements every taxation method in Nash, strong and coalition-
proof equilibrium. The second, where informational requirements are relaxed,
implements a large class of consistent and monotone methods in subgame per-
fect equilibrium. Neither mechanism employs the off-equilibrium devices used by
the general theory. Under fully private information no method is implementable.
JEL classiﬁcation: D31, D71
Key words: Feasible implementation, taxation methods, consistency, decentral-
ization, ﬂat tax
1. Introduction
Already since the Classical school, the topic of taxation has drawn constant atten-
tion from economists. Two early inquiries are found in Ricardo (1817) and Mill
(1848). For the most part, authors have agreed that reasonable taxation schemes
should rely on two fundamental principles: efﬁciency and equity. Accordingly,
two theories of taxation have been developed, each emphasizing one of these
two properties.
The modern theory of optimum taxation was greatly developed in the seven-
ties, due to the inﬂuential work of Mirrlees (1971; see also 1986 for a survey).
In economies where agents are making consumption/labor decisions, the ques-
tion asked by this literature is to what extent the introduction of an income tax
? We are grateful to an Associate Editor and two referees for helpful comments. We also acknowl-
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distorts the allocation of resources. Its ﬁndings are mainly negative: second-best
allocations usually arise. Within this approach, it is assumed that the govern-
ment’s goals are described by a social welfare function which depends only on
the after-tax allocation, thereby disregarding property rights altogether.
The equity approach, adopted by Bentham (1789), Mill (1848), Edgeworth
(1898), Young (1987) and others, and under which this paper falls, concentrates
on normative issues. It poses questions that relate income distribution and prop-
erty rights. Agents’ incomes are given exogenously, which means that the labor
(production) decision has already taken place. In addition, the level of taxes that
the tax authority wants to collect (perhaps in order to ﬁnance an efﬁcient level of
public expenditure) has also been decided. The problem is then how to split the
amount of taxes among the agents, taking into account their taxable incomes.1
Recently, the machinery of axiomatic game theory has been successfully ap-
plied to this approach. Young (1988) characterizes Mill’s equal sacriﬁce methods
and Dagan (1994) axiomatizes Bentham’s least sacriﬁce method. Both charac-
terizations use the consistency property (see Sect. 2 below and Thomson 1990).
These axiomatic criteria provide us with answers to the question of how to di-
vide ”fairly” the tax burden among the agents in society. In this paper, we bring
incentives to the forefront, without imposing a speciﬁc normative criterion. That
is, if the tax authority does not know the agents’ incomes and it wishes to im-
plement a certain taxation method, can the truth be elicited so that the ”right”
tax allocation results?
Our answer to this question will be afﬁrmative (if information is not fully pri-
vate) because we do not require dominant strategy implementability (that is, that
every agent tell the truth regardless of the others’ announcements). This strong
requirement may explain Mirrlees’s negative results: by using tax schedules in
which an agent’s tax depends only on his income, the actions of the others cannot
affect an agent.2 We are able to implement any taxation method in Nash, strong
and coalition-proof equilibrium, and a large class of consistent taxation methods
(that contains those of equal sacriﬁce) in subgame perfect equilibrium.
We shall assume that the tax authority has incomplete information about the
true vector of taxable incomes, which (in Sect. 4) is common knowledge among
all agents of society. The latter is not the most reasonable assumption when
studying income taxation in a large economy. Thus, one interpretation of our
exercise in Sect. 4 is that these agents are members of a club that wishes to
collect monetary contributions from them (the countries of the European Union,
for example).
1 One may argue that this approach misses the big picture by disregarding the issue of efﬁciency.
One possible interpretation, though, is that agents in the economy have quasilinear preferences over
the level of public expenditure. Thus, its efﬁcient level is independent of income distribution.
2 In an economy a la Mirrlees, Piketty (1993) also obtains positive results of implementation of
ﬁrst-best allocations using Bayesian equilibrium (it is an equilibrium to report the truth). This is done
via generalized tax schedules, in which an agent’s tax depends on the entire vector of incomes of
the economy. We explain in our concluding remarks that implementation in dominant strategies is
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The mechanism in Sect. 5 may be adapted to environments where the in-
formational requirements are weaker. This is done in Sect. 6. The property of
consistency in taxation has been defended as a coherent way to generalize a bi-
lateral principle of justice to many agent contexts. In addition, our Sects. 5 and
6 show that consistency of a taxation method may help to decentralize its imple-
mentation, as long as there exists an ”informationally big” player, i.e., a player
who has complete information. This assumption can be relaxed if the planner
wishes to implement the ﬂat (proportional) tax method. Then, the implementa-
tion can be decentralized through certain small groups of agents (ﬁrms, town
districts, etc.), where the existence of an ”informationally big” player in each of
them is the key.
In contrast with our previous positive results, Sect. 7 proves an impossibil-
ity theorem. If the economy is one with fully private information, no taxation
method can be implemented. Agents always have an incentive to under- report
their incomes. It is interesting to compare our two extreme results in our frame-
work. When information is complete among the agents, every taxation method
can be implemented, while none if information is private. The explanation lies
on the agents’ possibility of policing each other in the misrepresentation of one’s
income. This suggests that the tax authority should make use of all possible in-
formation ﬂows in the economy, either by making agents monitor one another or
by instituting efﬁcient auditing policies. Our mechanisms allow the tax authority
to check that agents do not over-report incomes, but nothing beyond that. That
is, as opposed to the auditing and tax evasion literature, we assume that it is not
possible to discover under- reporting.
Our framework is one in which preferences are known to the designer (util-
ity is strictly increasing in money), while the feasible set (the vector of taxable
incomes) is not. This departs signiﬁcantly from most work on implementation
theory, which has concentrated on the opposite case, including both the exten-
sive work that originates in Maskin (1977) and the papers on taxation mentioned
above.3 In particular, the notion of a mechanism as a mapping from message
proﬁles to feasible allocations is not straightforward, as the feasible set itself
is an unknown to the designer. Our ﬁrst precursor is the work on feasible im-
plementation by Hurwicz et al. (1995). Due to the unknown feasible set, the
added difﬁculty that the problem at hand presents is the issue of feasibility out
of equilibrium. We follow Hurwicz et al. (1995) in order to deal with this prob-
lem: in particular, we show in Sect. 3 that feasible implementation imposes that
the mechanism must depend in a non-trivial way on the true state of the world.
Other papers that deal with feasible implementation are Postlewaite and Wettstein
(1989) for the Walrasian correspondence, Tian (1989,1993) for the Lindahl cor-
respondence, Serrano and Vohra (1997) for the Core and Tian (1994) for the
Linear Cost Share Equilibrium correspondence.
In his 1992 survey, Moore suggests that implementation theory should turn to
applications and stress the realism of its mechanisms. As suggested there, when
3 See Maskin (1985) and Moore (1992) for detailed surveys of the subject.60 N. Dagan et al.
dealing with a particular application, one should expect ”nicer” mechanisms than
the abstract ones used by the general theory. Our mechanisms for taxation ﬁt
very well Moore’s goals, by dispensing with devices such as integer and modulo
games, non-compact strategy sets, large off-equilibrium punishments, and so on
(see also Jackson (1992) for a critique of these devices). The two mechanisms
we present are simple enough: in one of them, every agent reports all incomes
to a central agency; in the other the designer chooses a tax collector, who makes
a tax proposal, and agents bargain over taxes.
2. The taxation model
We present a taxation problem, ﬁrst introduced by O’Neill (1982) and Aumann
and Maschler (1985) in the context of bankruptcy. An economy or taxation
problem is a pair (x;T), where x 2 RN
+ is the list of taxable incomes, N is a
ﬁnite set of agents that contains at least two members, and 0  T 
P
i2N xi
is the total amount to be collected. A tax allocation is a list t 2 RN such that
0  t  x,
P
i2N ti = T, that is, subsidies to agents are ruled out and a total
amount of taxes is to be collected (for any two vectors a;b, we write a  b
to mean ai  bi for all i). We denote the set of all tax allocations of (x;T)b y
A(x;T).
A taxation method is a function f that assigns a tax allocation to each econ-
omy. A taxation method imposes taxes upon the agents as to collect the amount
T. Note that taxes are not employed to conduct transfer payments among the
agents in the economy.
Examples
a) Equal sacriﬁce methods Let U : R++ ! R be a continuous and strictly
increasing function that satisﬁes limy!0U(y)=−1. The equal sacriﬁce method
f relative to U satisﬁes
f (x;T)=t $9 c  0 such that 8i 2 N with xi > 0;U(xi) − U(xi − ti)=c:
These methods assign taxes so as to equalize absolute sacriﬁce evaluated accord-
ing to a prespeciﬁed utility function. The equal sacriﬁce method with respect to
the logarithmic function is the proportional taxation method or ﬂat tax. The equal
sacriﬁce principle in taxation appears in Mill (1848, Book V).
b) The head tax: ti = minf;xig;
c) The levelling tax: ti = maxfxi − ;0g;
d) The Cohen-Stuart (1889) - Edgeworth (1898) family of progressive methods:
ti = maxf0;xi − x
i g;
e) The Cassel (1901) methods: ti = x2
i =(xi + ); where  is determined so that P
i2N ti = T.
A method f is T-monotone or simply monotone if for all (x;T) and 0  T0 
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to be collected does not harm any agent. A method f is strictly monotone if for
all (x;T) and 0  T0 < T,i fxi > 0 then fi(x;T0) < fi(x;T).
A method f is consistent if for any ﬁnite non-empty set I of agents, for all
(x;T), x 2 RN
+ , and for all ; = = J  I:




where if y 2 RI
+;yjJ is the projection of y on RI
+. Suppose that a method f
assigns the tax allocation t to the economy (x;T). Suppose also that some subset
of agents wants to reallocate the total amount of taxes
P
i2J ti assigned to them. If
we apply the same method f to allocate this tax burden among these agents, each
of them will get the amount originally assigned to him, provided f is consistent.
Consistency and strict monotonicity were the key properties used by Young
(1988) to axiomatize the equal sacriﬁce methods. All the methods mentioned
above are consistent and monotone, although only the Cassel and equal sacriﬁce
methods are strictly monotone.
3. The implementation problem
We consider the situation where the mechanism designer (the tax authority)
knows the set of agents N and the amount T to be collected, but does not
know the agents’ incomes x. However, the designer knows that the amount T
can be collected from the agents. On the other hand, the economy (x;T) is com-
mon knowledge among all agents. In the language of implementation theory, the
set of taxation environments for a given set of agents N and a budget T is
Z(N;T): =f(x;T)jx 2 Rn




In the economies we consider, there is a single commodity – money. Further,
each agent’s preference is dependent only on his own after-tax income and it is
strictly increasing in this variable. As this is known by the tax authority (who,
on the other hand, does not know the agents’ incomes), we depart from most
of the literature on implementation of social choice correspondences, which has
concentrated on implementation problems with unknown preferences and known
feasible set.
Let Z be a non-empty class of economies. A mechanism for Z is a function
G that assigns to each economy (x;T) 2 Z(N;T) a game form G(x;T) deﬁned
as follows: G(x;T) h (Mi)i2N;gi, where Mi is the set of messages (strategies)
for player i, and g :
Q
i2N Mi ! A(x;T) is an outcome function that assigns
a tax allocation to each n-tuple combination of messages. A mechanism G(Z)
implements in a certain equilibrium concept the taxation method f on the class of
environments Z(N;T) if for all economies (x;T) 2 Z(N;T), all the equilibrium
outcomes of G(x;T) are f (x;T).62 N. Dagan et al.
Our deﬁnition of a mechanism for Z(N;T) does not preclude the possibility
that G be a constant function. Proposition 3.1 below, however, shows that such
a mechanism cannot implement any taxation method on any interesting class of
economies.
Proposition 3.1. Consider the class of environments Z(N;T). Let f be a taxation
method. Any mechanism G that implements f is dependent on the environments.
That is, for all two economies (x;T) and (x0;T) 2 Z(N;T),i ff(x;T) = = f (x0;T),
then G(x;T) = = G(x0;T).
Proof. Let G be a mechanism that implements f on Z(N;T). Let (x;T) and
(x0;T) be two economies in Z(N;T) with f (x;T) = = f (x0;T). Assume by way of
contradiction that G(x;T)=G(x0;T).
Because G implements f , there exist equilibrium messages m such that
g(m)=f (x;T). Furthermore, since G(x;t)=G(x0;t), f (x;T) is also an equilib-
rium outcome of G(x0;t), which is a contradiction. u t
Remark: Proposition 3.1 is independent of the equilibrium concept considered.
Hurwicz et al. (1995) proved a similar result in the context of implementation
in exchange economies in which the planner knows the agents’ preferences but
does not know the endowments. A necessary condition for implementability in
our context is thus the dependence of the game form on the vector x of taxable
incomes. Of course, this cannot mean that the designer knows the environment
beforehand; likewise, we should not assume that the feasible set of incomes can
be fully veriﬁed, as would be the case if the planner could conﬁscate every
agent’s income. In either of these two cases, implementation becomes trivial: a
mechanism is simply not needed since it is possible to impose directly the desired
taxation method. However, in view of Proposition 3.1 and given the requirement
that the mechanism assign feasible allocations in and out of equilibrium, partial
veriﬁability of the feasible set is required.
We shall therefore assume, like Hurwicz et al. (1995), that the planner can
verify the announced incomes: every player must report incomes to the planner,
and show the reported amount. That is, while reporting less than one’s income
is possible, exaggeration is ruled out.
Formally, we say that a mechanism G(Z)i sacceptable if for all economies
(x;T) 2 Z(N;T) and for all i 2 N player i’s strategy set Mi in G(x;T)i so f
the form X  Ii where X =(
Q
i2N Xi) \ Y , Xi =[ 0 ;xi], and Ii and Y  RN
are non-empty sets independent of x. Acceptability requires that the mechanism
G depend on the environment only through the set X, which by deﬁnition does
not allow any agent to overstate anyone’s income. As for Y and Ii, they are
independent of the environments. For example, Y may be the set of z such that
(z;T) is an economy, whereas Ii is agent-speciﬁc.
Proposition 3.1 also clariﬁes the issue that the words ”mechanism” and ”game
form,” that are generally used interchangeably, refer to different objects in this
context. The former refers to the class of ”game forms” that is needed to perform
the implementation over the class of environments Z(N;T), while the latter refersFeasible implementation of tax methods 63
to the game for a particular economy. From now on, we shall abuse language
slightly and talk about a ”mechanism” even when we refer to the ”game form”
for a particular economy.
4. Normal form implementation
In this section we construct an acceptable canonical mechanism in normal form
that implements every taxation method. In contrast to the canonical mechanisms
of the theory of implementation, our game form is valid in environments with
either two or more than two agents.
Let N =1 ;2;:::;n with n  2. Deﬁne the mechanism (Z(N;T)) as follows:









Denote by y the componentwise maximum of the agents’ reports, i.e., yi =
maxfy
j
i jj 2 Ng. For a message proﬁle m, deﬁne the outcome function g as
g(m)=f (y;T).
In designing the sets of strategies, we make heavy use of the complete infor-
mation assumption. The vectors yi must be veriﬁed. Each agent polices the others
and acts as a conﬁdant to the designer, providing him with information about
the entire proﬁle of incomes. As shown below, notice that not even coalitional
arrangements can perturb the ”efﬁcient” mutual policing.
Theorem 4.1. Let f be a taxation method. The mechanism  implements f in
Nash, strong Nash and coalition proof Nash equilibria over the class Z(N;T).
Proof. The unanimous report of x is a Nash equilibrium. Any individual deviation
does not change the componentwise maximum incomes announced and thus the
same tax allocation results.
There cannot be an equilibrium with an outcome other than f (x;T). Assume
by way of contradiction there is such an equilibrium. Then there is a player i
that pays a higher tax than he would have paid if the true incomes were reported.
Hence, this player has a proﬁtable deviation: to announce the true incomes and
pay fi(x;T).
Note ﬁnally that the Nash equilibrium suggested above is also a strong Nash.
The only coalition that can change the tax allocation is the coalition of all agents.
However, since the total tax levied must be T, it cannot be that all agents are
better off by deviating. Finally, it is also a coalition proof Nash equilibrium as
any strong Nash is coalition proof.4 u t
Remarks: I) Since the mechanism maps messages into tax allocations, it is not
wasteful: the tax authority always collects T (both in and out of equilibrium).
II) No properties of the taxation method f are required in Theorem 4.1. Note
that the deviation of the agent used in the proof does not say that he maximizes
4 Strong Nash equilibrium requires the strategies to be immune to all coalitional deviations. Coali-
tion proof Nash equilibrium considers only ”self-enforcing” coalitional deviations. For formal deﬁ-
nitions, see Bernheim et al. (1987).64 N. Dagan et al.
the other agents’ reported incomes, but announces the true incomes which may
include a higher report of his own income. This argument holds independent of
any properties of the taxation method. Since we do not assume that the taxation
method is increasing in an individual’s income, maximizing the other agents’
incomes in the report is not necessarily a dominant strategy.
5. Extensive form implementation of consistent methods
Despite its many advantages, an objection against the mechanism  in a private
ownership economy is that it is not ”privacy-preserving.” That is, every agent is
responsible for the report to the tax authority of the entire proﬁle of incomes. It
would be more realistic to think that agents ”mind their own business,” and that
they resort to comparisons of incomes before the tax authority only when they
wish to challenge a given allocation of taxes. This is a virtue of the mechanism
presented in this section.
The next mechanism is an extensive form that implements a large class of
consistent and monotone methods in subgame perfect equilibrium. We restrict our
analysis to the case where all incomes are positive. That is, denote by Z (N;T)
the following subclass of Z(N;T):
Z (N;T): =f(x;T) 2 Z(N;T)jx 2 RN
++g:
The following mechanism will allow us in Sect. 6 to dispense with the assumption
of a complete information environment. Although stronger than necessary, we
maintain it in this section.
Let ((x1;x2;:::;xn);T) 2 Z (N;T)b ea nn-person economy. We describe
informally the game γf(x;T) as follows. The planner chooses player 1 to be its tax
collector. Player 1 must make a tax proposal to which the rest of the players must
respond. If a player i accepts the proposal, player 1 has the power to enforce that
player i will pay those taxes. If player i rejects, he renegotiates his taxes with the
tax collector using the game of Sect. 4. These bilateral renegotiations determine
the tax paid by each rejector. Finally, the tax collector pays the remainder of the
tax bill.
Formally, player 1 (the agent with index 1) proposes a tax allocation t in
A(x;T). Following this proposal all the other agents respond sequentially, either
by accepting or rejecting the offer. The order of responses follow the protocol
induced by the agents’ indices, namely agent 2 is the ﬁrst to respond and agent
n is the last one. In order to continue with the deﬁnition of the game and to
deﬁne the players’ payoffs, we need to deﬁne an auxiliary variable of ”interim
tax payments” for the proposer. Given a proposal t, deﬁne w1
1 = t1. Assume now
that w
i−1
1 has already been deﬁned for all k between 2 and i( n). If player i
accepts the proposal t, his tax payment is ti. In this case set wi
1 = w
i−1
1 and it is
i + 1’s turn to respond, unless i = n in which case the game ends. If i rejects,
player 1 and i conduct renegotiations using the game form [(x1;xi);w
i−1
1 + ti]
to determine i’s payoff and wi
1 (it is easy to see that [(x1;xi);wi
1−1+ti]i sFeasible implementation of tax methods 65
indeed an economy). The amount wi
1 is determined to be 1’s tax payment in the
bilateral negotiation and i’s tax payment is his own share. After all players have
responded, player 1 pays wn
1 and the game ends.
Theorem 5.1. Let f be a consistent and strictly monotone taxation method. The
mechanism γf implements f in subgame perfect equilibrium on Z (N;T).
Proof. Fix an n-player economy (x;T) 2 Z (N;T) and consider the game
γf(x;T). Let t = f (x;T). The proof that there is a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium payoff of γf is organized in ﬁve lemmas.
Lemma 5.1.1. In any subgame perfect equilibrium of γf(x;T) player 1’s equi-
librium tax payment is at most t
1 .
Proof. Player 1 can guarantee that his taxes are at most t
1 by proposing t and





i ]. By consistency of f and a
straightforward induction argument, this last expression equals t
1 for all i. u t
Lemma 5.1.2. Let s be a subgame perfect equilibrium of γf(x;T) and consider
a node in the game tree where player i > 1 has to respond to proposal t. Let
w
i−1
1 be player 1’s current interim tax and let zi be i’s equilibrium payoff in this
subgame. Then, according to , the subsequent interim tax wi





1 + ti]g and zi = minfti;fi[(x1;xi);w
i−1
1 + ti]g.
Proof. The proof is by backwards induction. Let i = n. If player n ac-




1 . If player n rejects the
proposal t, they go to the renegotiation game [(x1;xn);w1n − 1+tn] after
which the game ends. By Theorem 4.1, the unique equilibrium outcome of
this renegotiation game is f [(x1;xn);w
n−1
1 + tn]. Therefore, since  is a sub-
game perfect equilibrium we must have zn = minftn;fn[(x1;xn);w
n−1






1 + tn]g. Note that since f is strictly mono-
tone, player 1’s tax payment z1 = wn
1 is strictly increasing in w
n−1
1 .
Assume now that the statement of the lemma is true for i = n;:::;k +1 and
let i = k.I fk accepts, he will pay tk. If he rejects, 1 and k go to the bilateral
renegotiation game [(x1;xk);w
k−1
1 +tk]. In this stage some wk
1 will be determined
in equilibrium. By the induction hypothesis, 1’s ﬁnal tax payment is strictly
increasing in wk
1 and by the rules of the game, k’s payment is strictly decreasing
in wk
1. Therefore 1 and k face a strictly competitive situation. Moreover, both




which means that in equilibrium this is going to be the interim tax payment. As
a result we have that, since  is a subgame perfect equilibrium,
zk = minftk;fk[(x1;xk);w
k−1







Lemma 5.1.3. Let z be an equilibrium outcome of γf(x;T). Then f1[(x1;xi);z1 +
zi]  z1 for all i between 2 and n.66 N. Dagan et al.
Proof. Let  be an equilibrium outcome of γf(x;T) and let fwi
1gn
i=1 be the interim
taxes of player 1, determined by the equilibrium path. According to Lemma 5.1.2,







1 + ti − zi
By () and the deﬁnition of z1, we have
 : z1 = wn
1  wi
1 for all i
Given the identity f1[(x1;xi);z1 +zi]+fi[(x1;xi);z1 +zi]=z1 +zi, it follows from
() and monotonicity of f that f1[(x1;xi);z1 +zi]+fi[(x1;xi);wi
1 +zi]  z1 +zi.
Using () we have f1[(x1;xi);z1 + zi]+fi[(x1;xi);w
i−1
1 + ti]  z1 + zi
and by (), f1[(x1;xi);z1 + zi]  z1. u t
Lemma 5.1.4. Let z be an equilibrium outcome of γf(x;T). Then z1  t
1 .
Proof. If z1 < t
1 , since z and t are both tax allocations, there must be some
agent i with zi > t
1 . There are two cases.
Case 1: z1 + zi  t
1 + t
i .





Case 2: z1 + zi < t
1 + t
i :





Therefore, by efﬁciency, f1[(x1;xi);z1 + zi] > z1.
But then in both cases we have f1[(x1;xi);z1 + zi] > z1 which contradicts
Lemma 5.1.3 u t
Lemma 5.1.5. Let z be an equilibrium outcome of γf(x;T). Then z = t.
Proof. Assume that z = = t. Then, there is a player i, with zi > t
i .B y
Lemmas 5.1.1 and 5.1.4 we know that t
1 = z1. Therefore this player can-
not be the proposer, and we have z1 + zi > t
1 + t
i . By strict monotonicity
of f , f1[(x1;xi);z1 + zi] > f1[(x1;xi);t
1 + t
i ], and by lemma 5.1.3 we have




contradicts consistency of f . u t
As for the existence part, it can be checked that the following n-tuple of strate-
gies constitutes a SPE: player 1 offers t and reports the truth in every bilateral
renegotiation; each responder i accepts t if and only if ti  fi[(x1;xi);w
i−1
1 + ti]
and reports the truth in every bilateral renegotiation.
Therefore, the mechanism γf implements f in SPE on Z (N;T). u t
Remark: The mechanism is non-wasteful. Also, if the taxation method is anony-
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the agents. The mechanism imposes the natural protocol just for convenience.
The naming of the players can be any other.
An interesting class of taxation methods satisﬁes both consistency and mono-
tonicity, but not strict monotonicity (e.g., the head tax, the levelling tax, the Co-
hen Stuart/Edgeworth methods). However, all these methods share the property
that, in the tax allocation they prescribe, the share of the richest player is strictly
monotone in the total tax T. For these methods we can make the following
observation.
Remark: Suppose x1  xi for all i 2 N. Let f be a consistent and monotone
taxation method such that player 1’s tax payment is strictly monotone in T. Then,
the mechanism γf implements f in subgame perfect equilibrium on Z (N;T).
To see this, note that in the proof of Theorem 5.1, strict monotonicity is needed
only for the proposer’s share.
For these methods the mechanisms γf when the proposer is not one of the
richest agents in the economy, may yield a continuum of equilibrium payoffs,
as shown in Example 1. Therefore, to implement them with this game form, the
designer would require an additional piece of information: the player with the
highest income (and no other) must be the tax collector.
Example 1: Let (x;T) = ((2;000;12;000;1;000);7;000) and let f be the head tax
method. Then, f (x;T)=( 2 ;000;4;000;1;000). Then, the reader can check that
the set of SPE tax payments of γf(x;T)i sf(2;000;4;000 + e;1;000 − e) for
0  e  1;000g.
6. Some departures from complete information
Thus far the analysis of Sects. 4 and 5 has assumed that the environment was
one of complete information. While this is a plausible assumption if our problem
is to raise monetary contributions from the members of a small club, it is clearly
inappropriate for a taxation problem in a large economy. However, notice that the
informational requirements of the consistency-based mechanism γf in Sect. 5 can
be substantially relaxed as long as there exists one ”informationally big” player.
Speciﬁcally, while the proposer must have complete information about the n
players’ incomes, the n −1 responders need only to know the proposer’s income
(besides his own, of course). This requires the game to satisfy that the ”interim”
outcomes achieved in the negotiations under  are publicly known.
This suggests the following scenario. In a centrally planned economy where
every agent works for the center, tax collection could be left to the center itself.
Using the mechanism γf of Sect. 5 the center sends a tax proposal to each of
the workers, who can either accept it or renegotiate their tax payment before the
tax authority. The necessary assumption is that the center knows each agent’s
income and each agent knows the center’s ”proﬁts.” If the taxation problem is
the collection of contributions in a small club, the elected president (who may
have complete information through access to the club’s ﬁles) should make the
tax proposal.68 N. Dagan et al.
One shortcoming of the theory we present is the need of the ”information-
ally big” player. One may wonder about how much can be said in regards to
implementation under less stringent informational assumptions. Unfortunately,
this does not seem to yield positive results. For example, suppose that the n
agents are arranged in a circle and that each agent knows only his income
and that of his two neighbors. Then, a mechanism that pins down each pair
of neighbors using consistency need not yield the desired tax allocation for
the entire economy. Suppose that the taxation method is the head tax. Let the
taxation problem be (x;T) = ((2;000;500;12;000;500;1;000;500);8;500). No-
tice that f (x;T)=( 2 ;000;500;4;000;500;1;000;500). However, the tax alloca-
tion t =( 2 ;000;500;4;500;500;500;500) satisﬁes that for all neighbors i and j
(ti;tj)=f ((xi + xj);ti + tj).
In the case of the ﬂat tax, on the other hand, the informational requirements
are smaller since we can decentralize the implementation across many small
groups. Then, we shall require that certain aggregate information is available
and that there is one ”informationally big” player in each smaller group.
For instance, suppose the U.S. Federal Government wishes to implement
the ﬂat tax method f . The set of agents N is then a very large ﬁnite set. The
Federal Government may know the amount T it wants to collect and it has
data on the GNP
P
i2N xi, so that it knows that
P
i2N xi  T. In addition, the
Federal Government may possess data on the aggregate incomes of each of the
states, that is, partitioning the set N into N = fN(1);:::;N(50)g, it knows the
vector (xN(1);:::;xN(50)) of aggregate state incomes. The Federal Government
can then delegate the tax collection to the different states, expecting from each
state N(i);i =1 ;:::;50, an amount TN(i) such that f ((xN(1);:::;xN(50));T)=
(TN(1);:::;TN(50)).
Each of the states may have information about the aggregate incomes of each
of its counties and therefore can delegate the tax collection of the amount TN(i)
on them; similarly, each county can do the same with the towns, each town, with
its districts. Say this is the last step of decentralization. We can assume that the
district representative, who has been elected to ofﬁce, knows the people in the
district well enough to have complete information about their incomes (or he/she
can have access to those data). On the other hand, the tax payers in the district
also know his/her income (after all, he/she was elected by them and at the time
they gathered enough information about the candidate). Then, the mechanism
γf can be applied to each of the districts and the proposer must be the elected
ofﬁcer.
As reported in Adams (1993), this procedure resembles the one that Augustus
introduced in the Roman Empire: ”To develop a more uniform system, Augus-
tus decreed that the entire empire should be appraised for tax reform. A great
census should be taken to register everybody and everything :::The registration
ordered by Augustus did not mean that taxes were to be controlled by the central
government. To the contrary, the census involved a decentralization of the tax
system. Individual tax payers would never again face Roman tax men. Tax col-
lection would be a local matter administrated by local people. The census let theFeasible implementation of tax methods 69
Roman government know how much wealth and how many people were in the
empire. With this information, Rome could make a more equitable assessment
against every city and leave collection methods for local administration. Previ-
ously, Roman publicani had created a direct link from tax payers to the central
government. The new system of Augustus took the Roman government out of
the process of assessing and collecting taxes on an individual level” (p. 94).
Other examples come to mind, where a corporate ﬂat tax that must be col-
lected by the central authority can be decentralized across different productive
sectors, in which the largest ﬁrm in a given sector (who plausibly may have an
informational advantage) must act as the tax collector. Alternatively, imagine an
income/corporate ﬂat tax where corporations are considered like other individu-
als (their proﬁts are their taxable incomes). In this case, each ﬁrm may be the
tax collector for the central tax authority: each ﬁrm knows the wages of all its
employees through payroll, while the employees know the ﬁrm’s proﬁts.
Information in this economy is very much decentralized. In particular, the
small agents need not know anything about each other’s income, while the tax
collector in each group needs information only about the group. Also, the central
tax authority needs only the aggregate intermediate data to delegate its functions.
If the taxation method is other than the ﬂat tax, this scheme will not work in
general: additional information beyond the sum of agents’ incomes in a group
is needed to obtain the desired tax allocation. For example, suppose we are
interested in the levelling tax method, there are 10 agents who live in two regions
(2 in the north, 8 in the south), each of them has an income of $1;000 and we
want to collect $1;000. Then we would like to collect $100 from each agent.
However, the decentralization scheme through regions would give us that the
agents in the north should pay nothing while each agent in the south should pay
$125 : f ((2;000;8;000);1;000) = (0;1;000).
7. Fully private information
The discussion in the previous section should be suggestive that implementation
becomes more difﬁcult in our environments the more private information is there
in the economy. This section conﬁrms this intuition with a negative result in the
case of fully private information.
Suppose that each agent i 2 N knows only his income xi and does not know
the incomes of any other agent. That is, agent i has a non-degenerate conditional
density function Pi(x−ijxi) over the incomes x−i of all other agents. This density
assigns positive probability only to sets of values for x−i such that ((0;x−i);T)
is an economy. Denote this class of environments by Z 0(N;T). This is consistent
with the assumption of fully private information, especially plausible in large
economies.
We model this as a problem of incomplete information and the game theoretic
solution concept we use is Baysian equilibrium: each possible type of each agent
i must play a best response to the other agents, given the information he holds
about them, that is, given Pi(x−ijxi). The following is our next result:70 N. Dagan et al.
Theorem 7.1. Let f be a taxation method. The method f is not incentive compat-
ible over the class Z 0(N;T). Therefore, there does not exist a mechanism G that
implements f in Bayesian equilibrium over this class.
Proof. By the revelation principle, there is no loss of generality in restricting
attention to direct mechanisms, that is, those in which each agent is asked to
report his income. We shall prove that there does not exist a direct mechanism
G with a Bayesian equilibrium that yields taxes equal to f (x;T) for all possible
(x;T) in the class.
Suppose not. That is, assume that G is a direct mechanism with such a
Bayesian equilibrium. We will show that agent i with income xi > 0, who pays
positive expected taxes, has a proﬁtable deviation: to imitate another type of
agent i with income x0
i = E[fi((xi;x−i);T)jxi] − e < xi for e small enough,
which is a contradiction (notice that the strategy set of the agent with income x0
i
is contained in that of the agent with income xi). In equilibrium, agent i with
income xi is paying positive expected taxes. When he deviates and reports x0
i,
by deﬁnition of a taxation method, he will end up paying lower expected taxes.
Notice how the assumption about the class of environments guarantees that this
deviation always induces an economy. u t
8. Concluding remarks
For taxation problems with at least two agents, we have presented ”canonical
mechanisms” that implement all taxation methods (as the mechanism in normal
form does) or a large class of consistent methods (as the one in extensive form).
Both mechanisms appear very natural and dispense with the off-equilibrium de-
vices that the general theory utilizes. The latter mechanism has the advantage of
being suitable for environments where the information is not complete. However,
no method can be implemented if the information is fully private. The imple-
mentation problem in this paper requires the tools of feasible implementation and
any successful mechanism must depend on the underlying environment.
Although the assumption that agents know every income may seem restric-
tive, the mechanism in normal form has many advantages. In particular, it imple-
ments all taxation methods for bilateral environments and serves as a support for
the mechanism in extensive form. In the latter mechanism agents may bargain
over taxes with the tax collector and the interpersonal comparison of incomes is
used only as a ”last option.” This may ﬁt situations in which a certain legal or
institutional environment surrounds multilateral negotiations in a small club, or
may be representing the appeal to the central tax authority in a large decentralized
economy.
It is also interesting to note that, although taxation and bankruptcy problems
are treated as equivalent in the axiomatic literature, they look very different from
the point of view of incentives. Formally, we denote a bankruptcy problem by
(E;d), where E is the estate to be divided and d is the vector of n claims on
it such that D =
P
i2N di  E, and a bankruptcy rule h(E;d) is a function thatFeasible implementation of tax methods 71
assigns a feasible allocation (a division of the estate E that awards no creditor
more than her claim) to each bankruptcy problem. Then, a bankruptcy problem
can be translated into a taxation one as follows: the amount of taxes to be
collected is T = D − E, that is, the money lost by the set of creditors, and the
vector of taxable incomes x = d (the claims). The taxation problem associated
with the bankruptcy problem (E;d)i s( d;D −E). Similarly, if h is a bankruptcy
rule, the corresponding taxation method would be f that assigns to each taxation
problem (x;T) the tax allocation f (x;T)=x − h(
P
i2N xi − T;x).
From the point of view of incentives and if we maintain the same assumptions
as for the taxation problem (see Sect. 3), the implementation exercise becomes
trivial. That is, suppose the estate is known to the court but the true claims are
not. Each claim is backed by a body of evidence. Clearly, a claimant may choose
to use only part of the supporting evidence the day of the trial (over-reporting is
technologically ruled out). Then, since utility is increasing in money and most
bankruptcy rules are monotone in one’s claim, we can solve the implementation
problem in dominant strategies by asking each creditor her claim. Every creditor
will report her true claim regardless of the other announcements. Notice that
the dominant strategy in taxation in a similar game (to report 0 income) does
not implement any taxation method. Finally, separate from the implementation
problem, the reader is referred to Dagan et al. (1997) for a bargaining view of
bankruptcy rules when the claims are known to the court.
References
1. Adams, C. (1993) For Good and Evil - The Impact of Taxes on the Course of Civilization. Madison
Books, London
2. Aumann, R. J., Maschler, M. (1985) Game Theoretic Analysis of a Bankruptcy Problem from
the Talmud. Journal of Economic Theory 36: 195–213
3. Bentham, J. (1789) An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Oxford (reprinted
by Hafner, New York, 1948)
4. Bernheim, D., Peleg, B., Whinston, M. (1987) Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I - Concepts.
Journal of Economic Theory 43: 1–12
5. Cassel, G. (1901) The Theory of Progressive Taxation. Economic Journal 11: 481–491
6. Cohen Stuart, A. J. (1889) On Progressive Taxation. In: Musgrave, R. A., Peacock, A. (eds.)
Classics in the Theory of Public Finance. Macmillan, New York, 1958
7. Dagan, N. (1994) On the Least Sacriﬁce Principle in Taxation. D.P. #50, Center for Rationality
and Interactive Decision Theory. Hebrew University of Jerusalem
8. Dagan, N., Serrano, R., Volij, O. (1997) A Non-Cooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy
Rules. Games and Economic Behavior 18: 55–72
9. Edgeworth, F. Y. (1898) The Pure Theory of Taxation. In: Musgrave, R. A., Peacock, A. (eds.)
Classics in the Theory of Public Finance. Macmillan, New York, 1958
10. Hurwicz, L., Maskin, E., Postlewaite, A. (1995) Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice
Rules when the Designer Does not Know Endowments or Production Sets. In: Ledyard, J.
O. (ed.) The Economics of Informational Decentralization: Complexity, Efﬁciency and Stability.
Kluwer Academic Publishers, Amsterdam, pp. 367–433
11. Jackson, M. (1992) Implementation in Undominated Strategies: a Look at Bounded Mechanisms.
Review of Economic Studies 59: 757–775
12. Maskin, E. (1977) Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality. Mimeo, M.I.T72 N. Dagan et al.
13. Maskin, E. (1985) The Theory of Implementation in Nash Equilibrium: a Survey. In: Hurwicz,
L., Schmeidler, D., Sonnenschein, H. (eds.) Social Goals and Social Organization. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge
14. Mill, J. S. (1848) Principles of Political Economy, (revised edition 1900). P. F. Collier and son,
New York
15. Mirrlees, J. (1971) An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation. Review of
Economic Studies 38: 175–208
16. Mirrlees, J. (1986) The Theory of Optimum Taxation. In: Arrow, K. J., Intriligator, M. D. (eds.)
Handbook of Mathematical Economics, vol. III. North-Holland, New York
17. Moore, J. (1992) Implementation, Contracts and Renegotiation in Environments with Complete
Information. In: Laffont, J. J. (ed.) Advances in Economic Theory, vol. I, (VI World Congress of
the Econometric Society). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
18. O’Neill, B. (1982) A Problem of Rights Arbitration from the Talmud. Mathematical Social
Sciences 2: 345–371
19. Piketty, T. (1993) Implementation of First-Best Allocations via Generalized Tax Schedules.
Journal of Economic Theory 61: 23–41
20. Postlewaite, A., Wettstein, D. (1989) Feasible and Continuous Implementation. Review of Eco-
nomic Studies 56: 603–611
21. Ricardo, D. (1817) Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. London
22. Serrano, R., Vohra, R. (1997) Non-Cooperative Implementation of the Core. Social Choice and
Welfare 14: 513–525
23. Thomson, W. (1990) The Consistency Principle. In: Ichiishi, T., Neyman, A., Tauman, Y. (eds.)
Game Theory and Applications. Academic Press, San Diego, CA
24. Tian, G. (1989) Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence by a Single-Valued, Feasible
and Continuous Mechanism. Review of Economic Studies 56: 613–621
25. Tian, G. (1993) Implementing Lindahl Allocations by a Withholding Mechanism. Journal of
Mathematical Economics 22: 169–179
26. Tian, G. (1994) Implementation of Linear Cost Share Equilibrium Allocations. Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory 64: 568–584
27. Young, H. P. (1987) Progressive Taxation and the Equal Sacriﬁce Principle. Journal of Public
Economics 32: 203–214
28. Young, H. P. (1988) Distributive Justice in Taxation. Journal of Economic Theory 44: 321–335